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COMMENTS
THE DILEMMA OF THE PERSON
IN A PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE
STATE: A PLEA TO THE
LEGISLATURE FOR HELP
This comment promotes adoption by the legislature of Senate Bill 139,1
the Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri. This bill allows a citizen of
Missouri to make an advance directive appointing a surrogate to make all
decisions concerning the giving or withholding of medical treatment in the
event that the declarant is unable to make those decisions personally. This
Comment will, first, review the establishment of the right to refuse treatment
and the law in this area. Then it will discuss the only Missouri case on
point. It will set out the provisions of the Senate Bill 139 and compare
it with other states' laws on the issue to show that additional legislation
is needed in Missouri regarding this issue. Although the Health Care
Surrogate Law of Missouri is a step in the right direction, the bill could
be greatly improved by the addition of several provisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The "evolution of medical technology is compelling the public, through
the courts ... [and] legislatures, to formulate new standards and procedures
for the health care of patients with irreversible brain damage." '2 Medical
miracles now force us to distinguish between life as we have known it and
life in which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant
part of it) does not.3 If all cognitive function of the brain has already
died within a body, should we allow the living part of that body to die
also? Therein lies the dilemma of the person in a persistent vegetative
state.
Consider this scenario: Your father (mother, spouse, brother, sister,
child) is involved in a serious automobile accident. In spite of (or, rather,
1. S. 139, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1989), [hereinafter Health Care Surrogate
Law of Missouri].
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as a result of) heroic4 medical measures, your father is now in a comatose
state. Although his heart, lungs and kidneys function normally, he does
not respond in any way when you speak to or touch him. He must be
turned every two hours to prevent bedsores. He has no control over his
bowels or bladder. He does not swallow therefore must receive artificially
the nutrition and hydration his body needs. Someone, probably a nurse,
but perhaps a machine, must feed him a nutritionally balanced liquid. The
liquid may be fed through a tube inserted into his nose and passed to his
stomach, or through a tube that has been surgically placed through the
abdominal wall into the stomach or small bowel. Your father does not
move any of his muscles. It is necessary for someone else to move his
arms and legs for him every so often to prevent the muscles and joints
from becoming fixed in one position. These bodily functions are controlled
by a part of the brain, which for your father, is no longer working
properly.
Despite the lack of normal brain functioning, physicians say that your
father may "live" or remain in this state for another twenty to thirty
years. If your father is in Missouri, there may be nothing that you can
do but visit him.
This troubling scenario exists for many families throughout the United
States. Such situations are, if not commonplace, at least not extraordinary
because of the advances in medical science over the past several decades.,
It has been estimated that there are five to ten thousand permanently
comatose patients alive today. 6
When should life-support measures for these patients be terminated,
and who should decide if, or when, it should be done? Essentially, the
question is to what extent should an individual be able to determine the
point beyond which life should not be continued for himself or his loved
one.7 In the past, this question has been dealt with quietly and privately
between the patient and the doctor.' Recent decisions have held that judicial
intervention is not necessary in determining when life-sustaining measures
should be terminated, unless unusual circumstances exist. 9 These circum-
stances include conflicts among health care professionals, or among family
4. Heroic measures may include such things as cardiovascular resuscitation,
respirator use, defibrillation (electric shock to the heart), or treatment with drugs
that affect the vascular system.
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMION FOR THE STUDY OF ETcAL PROBLEMS IN MED-
ICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BE AvioRAL RESEARCH, DECIDINo TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 16-18 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 424 (1988).
7. Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm-The Durable Power of Attorney,
Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROP. PRO. & TR. J.
1, 21 (1978) [hereinafter Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm].
8. Id.
9. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 344, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987).
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members, or between the family members and the health care professionals. 10
Unfortunately, fear of civil and criminal liability has often forced family
members or physicians to seek judicial intervention before health care
professionals will decide to withdraw treatment."
II. HISTORICAL LEGAL TREATMENT OF LIFE-SuPPORT TERMATION
Over the past decade, numerous judicial decisions have focused on
determining who can decide to terminate life-support measures for a co-
matose or terminally ill patient. The landmark case In re Quinlan12 estab-
lished the right to refuse medical treatment. Karen Quinlan, diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state, was kept alive (or so her physicians,
family and the court thought 3) by means of artificial respiration with the
use of a mechanical ventilator. 4
Her father, appointed as her legal guardian, petitioned the court to
allow the respirator to be removed.' 5 The petition eventually reached the
New Jersey Supreme Court. The court found Karen had a constitutionally
protected right to privacy with regard to medical decisions affecting her.' 6
The court in Quinlan found no specific United- States Supreme Court
decision directly on point. 7 Therefore, the Quinlan court looked to the
decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with personal privacy.' 8 By com-
paring the right to refuse medical treatment to the right a woman has to
terminate a pregnancy under certain conditions, the Quinlan court found
the unvritten constitutional right of privacy includes the decision to ter-
minate life-support measures under certain conditions. 19
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976).
13. Although Karen was removed from the respirator after the court decision,
she did not die until nine years later. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 57 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. July 3,
1989) (No. 88-1503).
14. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24-25, 355 A.2d at 654-55.
15. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
16. Id. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. However, to ensure the accuracy of the
diagnosis/prognosis, a hospital's "Ethics Committee," ior like body, must approve
the patient's prognosis and find no reasonable possibility of recovery to a cognitive,
sapient state. Only if there is agreement among the attending physician, the patient's
guardian and the Ethics Committee as to the prognosis of recovery may the life
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As a result of her incompetency, the only practical way Karen Quinlan
could assert that right was through her father as guardian. 20
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in Eichner
v. Dillon 21 followed the Quinlan analysis:
By parity of reasoning, the constitutional right to privacy [announced in
Roe v. Wade, U.S. Sup. Ct., 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d
147 (1973)], we believe, encompasses the freedom of the terminally ill but
competent individual to choose for himself whether or not to decline
medical treatment where he reasonably believes that such treatment will
only prolong his suffering needlessly, and serve merely to denigrate his
conception of the quality of life .... Individuals have an inherent right
to prevent "pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the act of dying."
(quotations omitted).Y
The Eichner court also found that the patient's guardian can make a
"substituted" or "proxy" judgment.?
After Quinlan, other courts also recognized the right to refuse medical
treatment using an additional judicial pathway. Along with finding a con-
stitutional right of privacy, those courts also based their decisions on the
common law right of a person to control his or her own body absent an
overriding state interest. 24 The United States Supreme Court articulated this
concept in 1891.2s The Court held that a plaintiff could not be ordered
to submit to a surgical examination, stating:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.26
In addition to the right to refuse medical treatment, early courts dealt
with the issue of the type of medical treatment which could be refused or
20. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
21. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
22. Id. at 458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 539 (quoting In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 466, -, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137 (1978), rev'd, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d
115 (1980)).
23. Id. at 476, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
24. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985);
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
25. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
26. Id. at 251.
[Vol. 54
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terminated.27 They allowed individuals to refuse "extraordinary" measures,
distinguishing them from "ordinary" ones. 28
In In re Storar,29 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court compared blood transfusions to nutrition and hydration or other
ordinary measures which could not be stopped. Under this reasoning the
court refused to permit the cessation of transfusions, even though the
patient would eventually die from the bladder cancer necessitating the
transfusions.30
In Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.,"' the Massachusetts
Supreme Court took a different viewpoint regarding nutrition and hydration.
The Storar court had viewed nutrition and hydration as a fundamental
need. It was therefore considered an ordinary measure and could not be
terminated. The Brophy court, however, held that receiving nutrition and
hydration through a gastrostomy tube, which could keep a person alive
for up to thirty-seven years, was an invasive procedure. The court found
the procedure extraordinary and that finding was a factor in allowing the
termination.3 2 Later courts found the distinction between extraordinary and
ordinary measures no longer applicable. 3  Instead, they focused on "whether
the burden of treatment so clearly outweighs its benefit to the patient that
to continue would be inhumane. ' 34 In other words, the focus became
whether the treatment is proportionate or disproportionate in terms of
benefits gained versus the burdens caused.15
27. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (decision not to start chemotherapy for a patient with acute
leukemia); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) ("do
not resuscitate" orders for the terminally ill), rev'd, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d
115 (1980); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (necessity for frequent blood transfusions for a pro-
foundly mentally retarded person with cancer of the bladder); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 992 (1976) (removal of a respirator).
28. See supra note 27. But see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
5, at 61-62 (respirators and cardiac defibrillation are considered "extraordinary"
measures as compared to "ordinary" measures such as providing nutrition and
hydration through the use of intravenous and other tubes).
29. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at - , 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
30. Id. at 381-82, 420 N.E. 2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
31. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
32. Id. at 437-38, 497 N.E.2d at 637. A gastrostomy tube is a soft tube
surgically attached so that one end lies in the interior of the stomach while the
opposite end is brought through to the outside of the abdominal wall, generally
on the lower left side of the abdomen. One reason for placing a G-tube is to
provide an alternate feeding method when a person cannot swallow. Once the G-
tube is in place, a nutritional liquid can be instilled directly into the stomach. 497
N.E.2d at 630.
33. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1018-19, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 491 (1983).
34. PRESmENr'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 84-85, 88.
35. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
1989]
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The Brophy court used a balancing test to decide whether life-support
measures should be removed. 6 The court balanced the person's constitu-
tional right of privacy and his common law right to refuse medical care
against the state's interest.17 In weighing the burdens and benefits, the court
held that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary, although a
factor to be considered, was not controlling.38 In Brophy, the court found
the patient's rights outweighed the state's interest in preserving life or any
other interest the state may have, and allowed the surrogate to decide
whether to terminate the life-support.3 9
Courts and commentators have identified four countervailing state in-
terests that may limit a person's right to refuse medical treatment: preserving
life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession
and protecting innocent third parties. 40 Of these four, the state's interest
in preserving life has been the central focus when balancing the state's
interest against a person's rights. 41
It is not too difficult for courts to find the person's rights outweigh
the state's interest when the incompetent person's life is prolonged by a
respirator. The more difficult question arises when the life-support measure
to be terminated is nutrition and hydration. The distinction may be based
on the emotional symbolism of infant care, providing food and water to
a person incapable of self-care. Numerous courts have grappled with the
question of whether a surrogate may decide to discontinue nutrition and
hydration for an incompetent ward.42 In all but two cases, the surrogate
was allowed to make that decision.4 3
36. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 432, 497 N.E.2d at 634. Other courts have also
used a balancing test to determine whether to remove life-support systems. See
Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen ex rel.
Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
37. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 432, 497 N.E.2d at 637-38.
38. Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
39. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
40. Farrell, 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 410-11. See also Rasmusson, 154
Ariz. at - , 741 P.2d at 683; Conroy, 98 N.J. at - , 486 A.2d at 1223;
PMxsmENr's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 31-32.
41. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd,
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660
P.2d 738 (1983).
42. See Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In
re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
399 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Cruzan, ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane);
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531
N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
43. Cruzan, ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en
bane); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
[Vol. 54
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In In re Westchester County Medical Center,4 a hospital sought per-
mission to insert a nasogastric feeding tube into a 77 year old, incompetent
woman over her daughters' objections .4  The court found that although
the patient was incompetent due to a series of strokes, she was not in a
coma, persistent vegetative state or terminally ill." She was simply an
elderly patient unable to feed herself in the normal manner because she
had lost her ability to swallow with her most recent stroke. 47 In fact, she
was awake and conscious, and could respond to simple commands and
carry on limited conversations."
The court required clear and convincing evidence showing that the
person held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life-
support in the circumstances presented. Factors to be considered as proof
include "the persistence of the person's statements, the seriousness with
which those statements were made, and the inferences, if any, that may
be drawn from the surrounding circumstances" in which they were made.49
In the past, the patient in Manchester County made statements about
declining artificial means of life-support. Due to the circumstances in which
they were made the court found that these statements were not controlling. 50
The court held the circumstances to be some evidence of "whether the
infirmities she was concerned with and the procedures she eschewed are
qualitatively different than those now presented." 5'
The statements this patient had made regarded terminally ill patients,
particularly ones with cancer. 2 At the time of the petition, the patient was
not terminally ill, nor did she have cancer. Her circumstances were very
different from the situations which prompted her declarations concerning
the termination of life-support measures. The court noted that it did not
intend that one must specify an exact condition for a declaration to be
effective. 3 Nonetheless, the court refused to expand the circumstances in
which this patient's declarations would be effective to the present situation.
Additional statements of "never wishing to be a burden" on her children
were also held to be insufficient evidence of her wishes in her present
condition. 54 The patient's daughters, who opposed the insertion of the
feeding tube, admitted they were unsure of what their mother would want
44. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
45. Id. at 522, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
46. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
50. Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
51. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
52. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
53. Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
54. Id.
7
Miltenberger: Miltenberger: Dilemma of the Person in a Persistent Vegetative State
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
done under the present circumstances." In light of all the facts, the Westch-
ester County court permitted the hospital to insert the tube and provide
nutrition and hydration in that manner.5 6
III. MissouRi's TREATMENT OF LIFE-SuPPORT TERMINATION
Cruzan v. Harmon7 is a case of first impression for the Missouri
Supreme Court; Cruzan dealt with a young woman diagnosed as being in
a persistent vegetative state.58 The Missouri Supreme Court, like many other
courts confronted with this issue, balanced the state's interest against the
burden of the treatment and the patient's rights. 9 However, unlike any
other court, the Cruzan court found that the state's "concern with the
sanctity of life rests on the principle that life is precious and worthy of
preservation without regard to its quality."' 6 To the Missouri Supreme
Court, this interest outweighed any right Nancy Cruzan had in determining
her own treatment. 61
The court found no express right of privacy under Missouri's consti-
tution nor under the federal constitution. 62 Unlike other courts, 63 Missouri's
Supreme Court read the United States Supreme Court decisions of Bowers
v. Hardwick" and Roe v. Wade65 as limiting the right of personal privacy
to exclude the right to terminate life-support measures, thereby also ex-
cluding a surrogate's right."
The court found that Nancy Cruzan does have a common law right
to refuse medical treatment.67 Nevertheless, given the fact that Nancy is
alive, and that the burdens of the treatments are not excessive for her,
the court found that the "immense, clear fact of life in which the state
maintains a vital interest" clearly outweighs her common law rights. 6'
55. Id. at 534, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
56. Id. at 552, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
57. 760 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id. at 412.
60. Id. at 419.
61. Id. at 424.
62. Id. at 417.
63. Gray ex reL Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
64. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (the Supreme Court refused to extend the right to
privacy beyond those relationships centered within the bonds of marriage or related
to procreation).
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Supreme Court limited a woman's right to
privacy in her decision to have an abortion).
66. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418.
67. Id. at 416-17.
68. Id. at 424.
[Vol. 54
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The Cruzan decision directly contrasts with the majority of other
decisions on this issue. Nearly unanimously, all courts but Missouri's have
found a way to allow persons wishing to die, or those who seek the death
of a ward, to meet the end sought.6 9
IV. LEGisLATrvE RESPONSE TO THE NEED FOR ADVANCE DmEcTrVEs
The fear of criminal and civil liability often prompts physicians and
health care organizations to require judicial sanction of the removal of
life-support systems for the terminally ill incompetent. 70 This is true despite
the fact that courts have consistently upheld both the right of a competent
person to refuse treatment and of a family member to act on behalf of
an incompetent person.7'
The number of cases regarding termination of life support72 demonstrates
that some other method is needed to resolve this issue. Courts have re-
peatedly requested state legislatures to take up the issue. 73 The Missouri
Supreme Court stated:
69. Id. at 420.
70. Capron, Legal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death, 14 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 141, 142 (1986).
71. Id. See Gallups v. Cotter, 534 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1988). Gallups involved
civil action brought by the parents of a deceased minor against her attending
physicians in which they requested damages for wrongful death, breach of contract,
fraud and outrage. After three flat electroencephalograms showing brain death,
physicians consulted the family and obtained its consent to remove the life-support
system. The father pleaded in the action that the family had not given its approval.
The court sustained a motion for summary judgement in favor of defendant
physicians because the evidence presented by plaintiffs was void of any indication
that defendants acted intentionally or recklessly, an element necessary to establish
a claim of emotional distress. Additionally, under ALA. CODE §§ 22-31-4, 22-31-1
(1984), death may be pronounced before termination of life support measures.
Thus, the statute provides immunity from civil liability for anyone acting in ac-
cordance with the statute. Gallups, 534 So. 2d at 587-88; Barber v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). Barber involved criminal charges
of murder and conspiracy to commit murder against two physicians who removed
a life-support system from a vegetative person pursuant to family wishes. The
prognosis was that the condition was permanent with little hope of recovery. The
charges were later dismissed.
72. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 412 n.4. The Cruzan court cited at least fifty
cases from seventeen jurisdictions decided from 1976 to the present.
73. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980) ("It is the type
issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum"); Eichner v. Dillon,
73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 535 (1980) ("an act of the Legislature would
... be most welcome and appropriate"); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d
404, 407-08 (1987) ("Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with
complexity ... [i]t is the type of issue which is more suitably addressed in the
legislative forum."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985)
("Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear standards for resolving
requests to terminate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients.").
9
Miltenberger: Miltenberger: Dilemma of the Person in a Persistent Vegetative State
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Broad policy questions bearing on life and death issues are more properly
addressed by representative assemblies. These have vast fact and opinion
gathering and synthesizing powers unavailable to the courts; the exercise
of these powers is particularly appropriate where issues invoke the concerns
of medicine, ethics, morality, philosophy, theology and law.74
The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed the same concern, namely that
the legislature is better equipped to develop and frame a comprehensive
plan for resolving the problems raised by this issue.7
Legislative Responses
Most states now have some form of legislation concerning refusal of
medical treatment made by a patient or a surrogate.7 6 States enacted laws
to meet the realities of contemporary law and medicine.7 7 They are generally
codifications of existing common law rights and are titled "Natural Death
Acts," "Medical Treatment Decisions Acts," "Death With Dignity Acts,"
"Right to Terminate Treatment Acts," "Life-Sustaining Procedure Acts"
74. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
75. Conroy, 98 N.J. at -, 486 A.2d at 1244 (1985).
76. A current list of living will statutes or natural death acts is as follows:
ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1981); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 -12.100 (1986);
A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201-3210 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201
to 218 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAmTY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1989);
CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
19a-570 to -575 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (Supp. 1988);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 -
.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1987); HAW. REv. STAT. §§
327D-1 to -27 (1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-
1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1986); IowA CODE §§ 144A.1-.11 (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1258.1 - .10 (West
Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 - 2931 (1985); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121
(1984); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.010 - .055 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101
to -111, 50-9-202 to -206 (1985); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 449.540 - .690 (1985); N.H.
REv. STAT. Am. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10
(1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
3101 - 3111 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.050 - .090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110
(1985); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4590h, § 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251
- 5262, tit. 13, 1801 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :12 (1984); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 - .905 (1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 10
(1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 - .15 (1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109
(1987).
77. Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill:
The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REv. 779, 786 (1984).
[Vol. 54
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/5
PLEA TO THE LEGISLATURE
or "Living Will Acts." ' 7 They allow a person to make an "advance
directive."
Advance directives are expressions of a competent person's self-deter-
mination and privacy rights as they bear on the person's future health
care. 79 These advance directives allow people to anticipate that they may
be incapable of making a decision regarding their own health care at a
future time. The directive allows individuals to specify, in advance, what
treatment they do and do not want, given certain circumstances. 0 Some
acts also allow a person to designate a surrogate person to make the
decisions for them.
1. Living Wills
"Living wills" are one form of an advance directive. Living wills are
generally documents which a legally competent adult writes as an affirmative
directive to medical personnel to withhold artificial life-support systems in
certain circumstances.8' One can make a living will before a terminal illness
or disease strikes but often does so after he or she is diagnosed as terminal.
This is particularly true in situations where the diagnosis is a disease that
may persist for a period of time, such as cancer or AIDS (acquired immune
deficiency syndrome).
"Living wills" were initially developed as documents without binding
legal effects; they simply gave directives to family and other health care
professionals about the person's wishes.82 Prior to the statutory adoption
of the living will, one individual sent his living will to a large medical
center in Houston, Texas. He was subsequently informed by the hospital
that it would not honor the document. 3 The hospital also informed him
that if he was admitted as a patient there, the hospital would do "whatever
it deemed necessary irrespective of the patient's wishes."8 s4 The first "natural
death" acts were a response to this type of attitude by health care or-
ganizations and gave legal recognition to living wills, provided the living
will followed certain procedural requirements. 5 Their enforceability has
rarely been litigated.16 Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
78. Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, Wis. L. REv. 737, 738-
39 n.3 (1987).
79. Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 Auz. L. REv. 373, 375 (1986).
80. PRESMENT'S COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 136.
81. Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 77, at 787.
82. PnswENr's COInnESSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 139.
83. Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm, supra note 7, at 26.
84. Id.
85. Gelfand, supra note 78, at 739.
86. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611,
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statutorily authorized the use of a living will,17 thus reducing the possibility
that it will be litigated in the future. A few cases have discussed the role
of a living will absent statutory authorization. In John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth,88 the Florida Supreme Court held that judicial
approval was not necessary to relieve family members, physicians, and
hospitals from civil and criminal liability when they relied on a living will
to terminate life-support systems from a terminally ill, comatose person. 9
In order for there to be criminal or civil liability, the court held it must
be shown that the actions were not in good faith but were intended to
harm the person.90 In Bludworth, the court stated:
[I]f such a person, while competent, had executed a so-called "living" or
"mercy" will, that will would be persuasive evidence of that incompetent
person's intention and it should be given great weight by the person or
persons who substitute their judgment on behalf of the terminally ill
incompetent.91
Although there was no living will in issue in In re Conroy,92 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a living will would be relevant evidence
of a person's intent. Since the New Jersey Legislature had not enacted a
statute recognizing the validity of a living will or prescribing the means
to execute such wills,93 the court did not address the issue of whether a
living will was legally binding. Regardless of its legal effect, however, the
court held it would be a relevant expression of intent, to which the court
should give weight.9 4
In Conroy, the court used a subjective standard and asked what the
particular person would have done if able to choose for himself or herself. 9
This contrasts with the objective standard-what a reasonable or average
person would choose under similar circumstances.
The court said that a carefully considered position, especially a written
position, might be evidence of a person's clear intent.96 A carefully con-
sidered position, according to the court, is one a person had maintained
over a number of years or had acted upon in comparable circumstances."
Courts and commentators have recognized that advance directives are the
optimal devices for determining when life-support measures may be withheld
87. See supra note 76 for a current listing of the living will statutes.
88. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
89. Id. at 922.
90. Id. at 926.
91. Id. However, no Florida statute providing for the execution of a living
will was cited in the opinion.
92. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
93. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1229 n.5.
94. Id. at , 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
95. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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or withdrawn from incompetent patients. 98 Statutes authorizing the living
will are not without their problems, however, and in some circumstances
may create more problems than they solve.9 For example, California's
statute said that advance directives were legally binding only for those
patients who were diagnosed as having a "terminal condition and only if
the patient waited fourteen days after being told of the diagnosis before
he or she signed the directive."1 ° "Terminal condition" was defined as
an incurable condition in which death is "imminent" regardless of the life-
sustaining procedures used.' ° ' A survey of California physicians, taken one
year following enactment of the Natural Death Act, found that only about
one half of the patients diagnosed as terminally ill remained conscious for
the required fourteen days after the diagnosis was made.'02 The California
Legislature has subsequently remedied that problem. In addition, it passed
a "durable power of attorney" act to supplement the Natural Death Act. 10 3
A "durable power of attorney" is a power of attorney that continues
in effect after the declarant is incapacitated and, in this case, allows a
designated third person to make all subsequent medical decisions.' 4
Another example of problems which a natural death act creates is
found in Louisiana. A misreading of the state's act led to serious results.
Health care providers, presumably relying on counsel's interpretation of
the statute, routinely required judicial authorization before terminating life-
support measures of terminally ill minors. 0 5
The Missouri Legislature passed a living will act in 1985, which took
effect on September 28, 1985.0 6 Missouri's act is unique in that the Missouri
Legislature set out, within the act itself, the four ethical and moral con-
siderations which courts have described as the state's interest to be weighed
against the individual's rights of privacy and control over their person.107
98. Dresser, supra note 79, at 376; Steinbrook & Lo, Artificial Feeding -
Solid Ground, Not A Slippery Slope, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 286, 288 (1988).
99. Vitiello, Louisiana's Natural Death Act and Dilemmas in Medical Ethics,
46 LA. L. REv. 259, 261 (1985).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67, 95 (1988).
103. C.. CIv. CODE §§ 2500-2506 (West Supp. 1988).
104. Ruark and Raffin, Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support. Principles
and Practice in Adult Medicine, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 25, 26 (1988).
105. Vitiello, supra note 99, at 261. See also Vitiello, On Letting Seriously
Ill Minors Die: A Review of Louisiana's Natural Death Act, 31 Loy. L. Rv. 67
(1985) (discusses the misunderstanding of Louisiana's natural death act and the
resulting crisis in health care for dying minors in Louisiana).
106. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 549.010-549.055 (1986).
107. Borron, Medical Treatment: Informed Consent, the Right to Refuse
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Under the act, a competent person may execute a declaration for
withholding or withdrawal of a death-prolonging procedure. 03 The act
defines a competent person as a person eighteen years or older, of sound
mind, who is able to receive and evaluate information and to communicate
a decision. 1' 9 The definition of a death-prolonging procedure "shall not
include the administration of medication or the performance of medical
procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort, care or to alleviate pain
nor the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition or hydration." 110
The declaration becomes operable when the declarant's condition is de-
termined to be terminal and the declarant is unable to make treatment
decisions."' A "terminal condition" is an incurable or irreversible condition
which, in the opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will
occur within a short time, regardless of the application of medical pro-
cedures."12
Although Missouri's living will act is a step in the right direction, it
is not without criticism."' For example, there is a question on what is
considered to be a "short time" and who is to decide how long a "short
time" is. To a terminally ill person, a short time may be any defined
period of life, from a few days to a few years."14 Additionally, patients
like Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan would not fall within the boundaries
of the act, even if they had made a living will while competent and the
act was in effect at the time of their accident. The act applies only to
terminally ill persons, not to those persons diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state.
Another problem arises from the use of vague statutory language.
Section 459.025, Missouri Revised Statutes, states that the declaration does
not become effective until the declarant is unable to make treatment
decisions. In addition, the directions of a declarant able to make treatment
decisions shall at all times supersede the declaration. This language would
imply that a conscious, incompetent person would be bound by the language
of the directive." 5 Yet the law provides for revocation, regardless of physical
or mental condition. It remains unclear whether a mentally incapacitated
patient can revoke the provisions of a living will previously documented." 6
If the declarant can revoke a declaration "in any manner by which the
declarant is able to communicate his intent to revoke, without regard to
108. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.015 (1986).
109. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(2) (1986).
110. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986).
111. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.025 (1986).
112. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(6) (1986).
113. See Murphy, A New Form of Medical Malpractice?: Missouri's "Living
Will" Statute, 42 J. Mo. B. 11 (1986).
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mental or physical condition,1117 who will decide when, and if, a revocation
has been made? This language seems to place the medical profession in
a dilemma, forcing a determination of whether there has been a revocation
of the living will."'
In Cruzan v. Harmon,"9 the trial court held that the living will act120
sets forth the public policy of the General Assembly. That policy prohibits
the withholding and withdrawal of nutrition and hydration under all cir-
cumstances. The trial court determined that, as written, the statute violates
Nancy Cruzan's right to liberty, due process of law and equal protection
under the state and federal constitution.12' None of the parties in Cruzan
argued to the Missouri Supreme Court that the Living Will Act applied.'22
The Living Will Act did not take effect until after her accident, and in
any event, Nancy had not executed a living will.' 21
The supreme court held that the living will act was not an issue in
Cruzan except that it states the Missouri Legislature's interest in the sanctity
of life.' 24 "We intend no judgment here as to whether the common law
right to refuse medical treatment is broader than the living will statute ...
The trial court erred in finding its provisions unconstitutional.' ' 25 Therefore,
the constitutionality of the provision in Missouri's Living Will Statute which
prohibits the removal of nutrition and hydration remains an issue for the
court to determine.
2. Health Care Surrogates or Durable Powers of Attorney
Another form of an advance directive is the durable power of attorney.
The most fundamental purpose of a durable power is to ensure reliance
by third parties on the agent's or surrogate's authority, so that the wishes
of the person creating the power will be effectuated. 26 It allows an individual
to delegate powers to an agent, directing the agent to act during periods
of disability or incapacity of the principal. The durable power of attorney
also ensures that the agent's authority will be honored by third parties at
all times. 27 Already effective for property and financial matters, the durable
power of attorney is now being extended to the area of health care decisions.
117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.020(1) (1986).
118. Borron, supra note 107, at 30.
119. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
120. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.101(3), 459.055 (1986).
121. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410.
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The designated agent will have the legal authority to decide if, or when,
to terminate life-support measures for the principal in the event the principal
is no longer competent. 28
Durable powers of attorney acts may also be known as "Health Care
Surrogate Laws." These laws protect the interests of an incapacitated person
by ensuring his or her well-being and self-determination. A durable power
of attorney, through which people may designate others to make health
care decisions on their behalf, is the most preferable type of advance
directive. 2 9 It provides a better vehicle than a living will for patients to
exercise self-determination. 30 Durable powers of attorney allow a person
to control decision making in a far broader range of situations than living
wills."3 Nevertheless, living wills are the most common statutorily authorized
form. 132
In life-support refusal or termination cases, durable powers of attorney
are preferred to living wills or natural death acts because they are unen-
cumbered by the many limitations that attend the natural death act di-
rectives."' By allowing the declarant to appoint a surrogate, there is an
increased likelihood that treatment decisions will be made in accord with
the declarant's personal preferences. 3 4 As one court stated:
Medical choices are private, regardless of whether a patient is able to
make them personally or must rely on a surrogate. They are not to be
decided by societal standards of reasonableness or normalcy. Rather, it is
the patient's preferences-formed by his or her own unique personal
experiences-that should control.'30
Some living will statutes specifically permit appointment of a surro-
gate.1 36 Other states have enacted statutes which provide specific durable
powers for health care decisions.13 7 In addition, there is precedent for the
128. Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 77, at 787.
129. PusmENTr's CoMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 145.
132. See supra note 76 for a current listing of living will statutes.
133. Alexander, supra note 102, at 93.
134. Rhoden, supra note 6, at 438.
135. In re Peter ex rel. Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, -, 529 A.2d 419, 423
(1987).
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. § 765.05(2) (1985);
IOWA CODE § 144A.7(1)(f) (1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(a) (West
1985); TEx. Rnv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 3(e) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:4 (1984); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-22-102 (Supp. 1988).
137. CAL. Crv. CODE § 2412.5 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2, para. 804 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (requires substantial conformity with
statutory short form); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.740 (1987) (requires substantial
conformity with statutory short form); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3105 (West
Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5603(h) (Purdon 1985); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 23-4.10-2 (Supp. 1988) (requires use of statutory short form); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1106 (Supp. 1988) (requires substantial conformity with statutory short form).
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proposition that a general durable power of attorney may be sufficient to
give the agent control over health care decisions of an incompetent person.' 38
In In re Peter ex rel Johanning,39 Hilda Peter was diagnosed as being
in a persistent vegetative state. 14° Prior to becoming ill, Ms. Peter executed
a durable power of attorney authorizing Eberhard Johanning to make all
medical decisions for her, should she become incapacitated. 14' Mr. Johanning
was made legal guardian of Ms. Peter after she became incompetent.' 42
He petitioned the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly, as required
by New Jersey statute, to have the nasogastric feeding tube removed from
Ms. Peter. In addition, he requested that nutrition and hydration and life-
support measures be terminated.' 43 The Ombudsman denied the request and
a suit ensued. 44 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the removal of
the feeding tube.
Although the New Jersey Power of Attorney Statute did not specifically
authorize conveyance of powers to make medical decisions, the court found
that the statute should be interpreted to do so.14S The court stated that
the specific granting of the authority to terminate life-support systems
would have been preferable.' 46 Nevertheless, the court allowed Mr. Johan-
ning to make any decisions concerning medical care for Ms. Peters. 47 A
significant amount of evidence indicating Ms. Peter's views on life-support
measures influenced the court's decision.' 41
Most durable power of attorney statutes are not enacted to deal expressly
with the issue of health care decisions for the incompetent person. Still,
the New Jersey Supreme Court construed its statute broadly enough to
138. Iowa's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act allows life sustaining treatment
to be withheld or withdrawn from a person who is terminally ill, and comatose,
incompetent or otherwise mentally incapacitated, even though that person has not
made a declaration. One person statutorily authorized to make that decision, in
conjunction with the attending physician, is "[t]he attorney in fact designated to
make treatment decisions for the patient should such person be diagnosed as suffering
from a terminal condition, if the designation is in writing and complies with section
633.705." IOWA CODE § 144A.7 (1987). Section 633.705 is the general power of
attorney statute. Thus, a general power of attorney will be sufficient to grant an
attorney the legal power to make medical decisions, if there is a provision granting
power of attorney.
139. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
140. Id. at - , 529 A.2d at 422.
141. Id., 529 A.2d at 422.
142. Id., 529 A.2d at 422.
143. Id., 529 A.2d at 422.
144. Id., 529 A.2d at 422.
145. Id. at - , 529 A.2d at 426.
146. Id., 529 A.2d at 426.
147. Id., 529 A.2d at 426.
148. Id., 529 A.2d at 426.
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include the power to refuse or terminate medical treatment.' 49 Other courts
may not be as expansive. In order to ensure the legal authority to delegate
such powers, specific legislation is preferable to reliance on judicial inter-
pretation of the existing power of attorney statutes.
V. MIssotUI's PROPOSED STATUTE
Senate Bill No. 139 was proposed and approved by the Probate and
Trust Committee of the Missouri Bar on September 18, 1987.'11 The Board
of Governors approved the bill on October 30, 1987 for sponsorship by
the Missouri Bar in the 1988 session of the Missouri Legislature.", Although
not submitted at that time, Senator Robert Johnson filed the bill in the
1989 Missouri General Assembly.
Unlike the "Living Will Act," the "Health Care Surrogate Law of
Missouri" would specifically authorize health care providers to comply with
instructions of a surrogate pertaining to the administration or withdrawal
of any care, treatment, service or procedure.1 2 The Missouri Legislature's
Committee on Aging recommended that this be altered to exclude any
procedure performed to provide nutrition and hydration.' 53 Because of this
amendment, the Probate and Trust Committee of the Missouri Bar con-
templated withdrawing its support of the bill. 54
According to the bill, the surrogate would be able to make any health
care decisions that his or her designate would have made for themselves
if he or she had decisional capacity.' 5 Decisional capacity, as defined by
the bill, is the ability to make and communicate a health care decision.5 6
The Senate bill is the statutory framework to specifically authorize the
appointment of a health care surrogate. The bill allows each citizen of
149. In re Peter ex rel. Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). This
case is one of three cases decided simultaneously by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
each dealing with the termination of life-support systems. In each of the three
cases, the court allowed the termination of the systems. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (competent but terminally ill person with amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis [Lou Gerhig's Disease] permitted to decide to have a respirator
removed); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (surrogate decision-
maker could make determination to remove life-sustaining medical treatment of
person in a persistent vegetative state).
150. Redd, Approved Draft and Comments, Missouri Health Care Surrogate
Law, The Missouri Bar Probate and Trust Committee, Subcommittee for Health
Care Surrogate Law (Oct. 30, 1987).
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id.
153. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, Missouri Public and Trust
Committee Amendment 2.
154. Probate Lawyers at Odds Over Health Surrogate Bill, Mo. Law. Weekly,
Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
155. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 6, 3.
156. Id. § (1).
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Missouri ("Grantor") to designate a person to make health care decisions
concerning that citizen in the event the citizen is unable, for any reason,
to make those decisions personally. 5 7 It also provides health care providers
with a statutorily authorized person on whose decisions they can rely without
fear of criminal or civil liability. 15
The practical benefit of this bill is that it provides a mechanism which
allows legally enforceable medical decisions to be made for a person, even
though the person may be incapacitated for only a short period of time
and is not terminally ill. A situation under which this might occur would
be if the person is incapacitated due to a stroke. Although the prognosis
of recovery may be good, the person is unable to communicate their wishes.
The bill would allow a surrogate to transfer the person to another health
care facility which offered more extensive therapy or was less costly to
the person. Another example of temporary incapacitation would be where
the person is in a delusional state. A surrogate, under this bill, could
legally authorize the administration of medication to correct the condition.
Under this bill, "health care decisions" include, but are not limited
to the following decisions: "consent to, refusal to consent to, withdrawal
of consent to, or prohibition of any care, treatment, service, or proce-
dure."'5 9 The grantor must have decisional capacity at the time of making
the designation of a surrogate. 16° Mere incapacity (whether actual or ju-
dicially determined) may not deprive the grantor of his or her right to
make health care decisions.16' The grantor may be incapable of making
business or personal financial decisions, but still retain the mental capacity
necessary to make personal decisions determining the use or refusal of any
medical intervention that may be necessary.6 2
Two or more surrogates may be named to serve at the same time.
The grantor may also name a successor or alternate surrogate.'63 This
provision allows the grantor flexibility and greater security. In the event
the designated surrogate could not serve as a health care surrogate, the
grantor retains control by having named an alternate or co-surrogate. In
addition, by making alternative designations, the likelihood that a surrogate
will be available is improved. The grantor has total control over the choice
of the surrogate and how many surrogates he or she desires. If the grantor
names two or more surrogates to act simultaneously, all decisions made
by the surrogates must be unanimous unless the designation provides oth-
erwise. 164
157. Redd, supra note 150, at 1.
158. Id. at 2.
159. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 2(4), 2.
160. Redd, supra note 150, at 2. See Comment section.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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A surrogate may resign at any time by giving written notice to the
grantor, immediate successor surrogate(s), and any health care provider
who is then waiting for the surrogate to make a health care decision.'65
The act prohibits an employee, owner, director, or officer of a health care
facility where the grantor is a patient or resident from acting as a surrogate,
unless related to the grantor within the fourth degree of consanguinity. 66
This prohibition protects elderly patients who may be residents of nursing
homes or other long-term health care facilities from the decisions of a
surrogate with a possible conflict of interest. The emphasis of the bill on
the value of preserving life makes this provision necessary. The goal is to
prevent decisions from being made by a surrogate with a monetary interest
in the person's demise.
In order to impress upon the parties the seriousness of the designation,
certain procedural safeguards are required. The designation must be in
writing, dated and signed by the grantor or at his or her direction. It must
be either witnessed by two or more individuals together in the grantor's
presence or acknowledged by the grantor in the presence of a notary public
or other person. 167 Any new designation or broadening of authority in an
existing designation must be executed in the same way. 68 This is essentially
the same procedure necessary for legal execution of a will. 69
The grantor may designate certain conditions or situations about which
the surrogate may or may not make a decision. The grantor may also
make a broad statement permitting the surrogate the same scope in decision
making as the grantor would have, if capable. Additionally, the grantor
may revoke all, or any part of, the authority previously given to a sur-
rogate. 170 The grantor, however, must have decisional capacity at the time
of the revocation in order for the revocation to be valid.' 7' Revocation or
limitation may be oral, written, or by destruction of the document or
designation, or at the direction of the grantor. 72 The lack of formality
necessary to effect a revocation or limitation is indicative of the strong
bias in favor of prolonging life.17 1
A surrogate may not make a health care decision for the grantor if
the attending physician has, in good faith, determined that the grantor has
decisional capacity. 74 Additionally, if no surrogate is available or willing
165. Id. § 3(2).
166. Id. § 3(3).
167. Id. § 4(1). A person disqualified as a surrogate cannot be a witness or
ijotary to the declaration.
168. Redd, supra note 150, at 3. (See also Comment to §4).
169. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 474.320, 474.337 (1986).
170. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 5, 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Redd, supra note 150, at 4. (See Comment to § 5).
174. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 6, 3.
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to make a health care decision, the health care provider may proceed as
if there were no surrogate designation. 17
5
If the grantor becomes incompetent, the surrogate may exercise his
authority in many situations where it would otherwise be necessary for a
court to be involved. These include: entering into or terminating agreements
with any health care provider, procuring confidential information (medical
records) of the grantor, and authorizing admission to or discharge from
a health care facility. 7 6
The statute provides a form which may be used as a designation of
a health care surrogate, but is not required. The form may be tailored by
the grantor to meet specific needs.'" It is appropriate for the grantor to
include any specific directions or to specify particular types of health care
he or she expressly authorizes or forbids. 78 It is suggested that the des-
ignation of a health care surrogate be made separately from a living will
or power of attorney because of the importance of its nature. 179 This form,
once given to a health care provider, becomes a part of the grantor's
medical record." 0 A health care provider who is unwilling to comply with
the provisions must inform the grantor and the designated surrogate promptly
upon receipt of the designation.' 8 '
The bill contains several sections which provide protection for third
parties who rely on the declaration. For instance, the bill creates a pre-
sumption that the surrogate's authority is valid." 2 No investigation into
the validity is necessary unless a third person possesses information as to
the surrogate's disqualification." 3 The bill also protects a health care pro-
vider, acting in good faith reliance on the designation, by providing im-
munity from civil or criminal liability for carrying out the surrogate's
instructions. ,14
Designed to complement the Living Will Statute and the Durable Power
of Attorney Act, the bill does not revoke, amend or limit the operation
of any other Missouri law. 15 Nor does it change the Autopsy Statute or
the Anatomical Gift Act. 86
The bill protects persons from being compelled to execute a designation.
It does so by prohibiting any person, corporation or governmental agency
175. Id.
176. Redd, supra note 150, at 4-5.
177. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 7, 3-4.
178. Redd, supra note 150, at 6.
179. Id. at 6. Comment to § 7.
180. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 8, 4.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 9(1), 4.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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from requiring a person to execute a health care surrogate designation for
a contract, or for the provision of any service, medical treatment or
benefit. 87 Nor will a designation made under this bill affect the sale or
procurement of a life insurance policy, or be deemed to modify any existing
life insurance policy.'88 The statute provides protection from insurance
companies by stating:
[n]otwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary, no policy of life
insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by a
health care decision made by a surrogate or by the withholding or with-
drawal from an insured grantor of any medical procedure or intervention
which would serve only to prolong artificially the dying process.'-
VI. COMPAUSON OF MIssouRI's STATUTE TO OTHIER STATUTES
Missouri's proposed act is a great improvement over the Living Will
Act in promoting the citizen's rights of self-determination with regard to
medical treatment decisions. While it avoids many of the problems of other
statutes,' 9° in some areas it could be improved.
Other states have enacted statutes which provide for a surrogate decision
maker. Some of these statutes give only general legal guidelines while others
are very specific. Illinois recently enacted a comprehensive statute 9' which
could serve as a guideline for Missouri legislatures. A review of other
states' statutes demonstrates the need for some revision of Missouri's bill.
California's Keene Health Care Agent Act' 92 differs from Missouri's
in several aspects. The California law provides that a surrogate has "au-
thority to consent, to refuse consent, or to withdraw consent to any care,
treatment, service or procedure to maintain, diagnose or treat a physical
or mental condition."' 193 Missouri's act does not distinguish between mental
and physical condition, referring only to "any health care decision." 19 It
could be argued that "any" is broad enough to cover both mental and
physical health care decisions. But the converse can also be argued, the
language says "health care decision" and mental conditions are not included.
Using language such as "any health care decision, regardless of whether
for physical or mental health care purposes" would avoid ambiguity.
187. Id. at 7; Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 9(3), 5.
188. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 9(2), 4-5.
189. Id.
190. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 6, 3. Missouri's
statute does not require a terminal illness to trigger the effectiveness of the dec-
laration. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(a) (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58 (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101(2)(v) (Supp. 1978).
191. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
192. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2500-2506 (West Supp. 1988).
193. Id. § 2500.
194. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 6, 3.
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The California act authorizes a court to revoke the power of an agent
or surrogate, if the agent "(1) authorizes anything that is illegal, (2) acts
contrary to [the declarant's] known desires, or (3) where [the declarant's]
desires are not known, does anything that is clearly contrary to [the
declarant's] best interests."1 95 The Delaware "Death With Dignity Act"
also safeguards the declarant from actions of the agent contrary to the
declarant's best interests. 19 The Illinois' Durable Power of Attorney Statute197
provides for judicial control, although expressed in broader terms. It simply
states that an agent's authority can be revoked by the court if the agent
is not acting properly. 9 Missouri's bill is silent on this issue. Perhaps the
drafters felt that the right of the court to remove a surrogate acting outside
his or her scope of authority was implied. Since most surrogates and
persons designating the surrogate will be lay persons, it would be wise to
include such a provision that clearly delineates the surrogate's legal re-
sponsibilities and provides a remedy should the surrogate act contrary to
those responsibilities.
Most of the natural death acts and surrogate health care acts do not
attempt to address the most frequently recurring situation-those cases in
which "decisions must be made on behalf of incompetent patients who
have not prepared advance directives."'9 This issue is addressed in Louis-
iana's Natural Death Act.20° A forerunner of the Louisiana statute was the
Arkansas Living Will Statute (repealed), which allowed a surrogate to
execute a living will on behalf of an incompetent adult or minor, who
had not previously executed one. 201 This statute differed from the majority
of living will acts which allow personal declarations only.m
195. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1988). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.10-2 (Supp. 1988).
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2506 (1983). Anyone who holds a good faith
belief that the withdrawal or withholding of a medical treatment in a particular
case is: (1) contrary to the expressed wishes of a declarant; (2) proposed pursuant
to a falsified, forged or coerced declaration; or (3) proposed without considering
an unlawfully concealed, destroyed, altered or cancelled revocation, may petition
the Court of Chancery for appointment of a guardian for such declarant.
197. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 80-1 to 804-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989).
198. Id. at para. 804-10. Illinois' Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney
for Health Care requires a "notice" paragraph at the beginning of each declaration
which states in capital letters, "A COURT CAN TAKE AWAY THE POWERS
OF YOUR AGENT IF IT FINDS THE AGENT IS NOT ACTING PROPERLY."
199. Vitiello, supra note 99, at 272. Although not specifically designated as
"surrogate health laws" or "durable power of attorney acts," living will or natural
death acts which provide for the appointment of a surrogate are also considered
in this comment.
200. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West Supp. 1989).
201. Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm, supra note 7, at 22-23. See
Arkansas Living Will Statute, 1977 Ark. Acts 879, § 3.
202. See Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra, note 1; The Keene
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In 1987, Arkansas repealed its earlier act and replaced it with the
"Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act. ' 20 3
This statute purposefully addresses the needs of a person who is permanently
unconscious. "Life-sustaining treatment" is defined by the Arkansas Leg-
islature as "any medical procedure or intervention that, when administered
to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of dying or
to maintain the patient in a condition of permanent unconsciousness. "2034
"Permanently unconscious" is defined as a "lasting condition, indefinitely
without change in which thought, feeling, sensations, and awareness of
self and environment are absent. '201 The current statute also provides for
surrogate decision making.?
The Louisiana statute contains a list of persons who may make a
declaration on behalf of a qualified patient who is incompetent or comatose
and who has not previously made a declaration.2 w There is also a similar
provision relating to a terminally ill minor.20 8 The list includes the spouse
Health Care Agency Act; CAL. CrV. CODE § 2500-2506 (West Supp. 1988); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (Supp. 1988); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para.
804 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
203. ArK. STAT. Am. § 20-17-201 to 20-17-218 (Supp. 1987).
204. Id. at § 20-17-201(4).
205. Id. at § 20-17-201(11).
206. Id. at § 20-17-214.
207. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.58.5(A)(2)-(3), .5(B) (West Supp. 1989)
provides:
A. (2) When a comatose or incompetent person or a person who is physically
or mentally incapable of communication has been certified as a qualified
patient and has not previously made a declaration, any of the following
individuals in the following order of priority, if there is no individual in
a prior class who is reasonably available, willing, and competent to act,
may make a declaration on the qualified patient's behalf:
(a) The judicially appointed tutor or curator of the patient if one has
been appointed. This Subparagraph shall not be construed to require
such appointment in order that a declaration can be made under this
Section.
(b) The patient's spouse not judicially separated.
(c) An adult child of the patient.
(d) The parents of the patient.
(e) The patient's sibling.
(f) The patient's other ascendants or descendants.
(3) If there is more than one person within the above named class in
Subparagraphs (c) through (f), then the declaration shall be made by all
of that class available for consultation upon good faith efforts to secure
participation of all of that class.
B. In any case where the declaration is made by a person specified in
Subparagraphs (A)(2)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f), there shall be at least two
witnesses present at the time the declaration is made.
208. LA. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West Supp. 1989) provides:
A. If a minor has been certified as a qualified patient, the following
individuals may voluntarily make a declaration to document the decision
[Vol. 54
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and other close relatives such as adult children, siblings, or parents.2 09 It
also includes a judicially appointed "tutor" or "curator," if one has been
appointed, 210 although the statute does not require that one be appointed
in order for a declaration to be made by a third person on behalf of a
qualified person. 21' If there is more than one person in the class of surrogates
listed, the Louisiana statute requires unanimity. 2 2 The language in Arkansas'
current statute is similar to that found in Louisiana's. Florida, Texas and
Utah also have statutes with similar language. 23
The Louisiana statute has been praised as making judicial intervention
unnecessary in most cases. 21 4 If it is necessary for the court to intervene,
the only issue for the court is the choice of surrogate. 215 It need not
contemplate the underlying medical question or the desires of the incom-
petent patient. 26 While a provision such as this does have potential for
abuse, it can be useful in filling gaps like those in the Quinlan and the
Cruzan cases. 217
In spite of its benefits and usefulness, portions of Louisiana's provision
have been criticized. The requirement of unanimity among class members
may give leverage to an unreasonable dissenter within the family, who
relative to withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or life-sustaining
procedures on a minor's behalf:
(1) The spouse if he has reached the age of majority; or
(2) If there is no spouse, or if the spouse is not available, or is a minor,
or is otherwise unable to act, then either the parent or the guardian of
the minor.
B. An individual named in Subsection A of this Section may not make
a declaration:
(1) If he has actual notice of contrary indications by the minor who is
terminally ill; or
(2) If, as a parent or guardian, he has actual notice of opposition by
either another parent, or guardian, or a spouse who has attained the age
of majority.
C. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require the making of a
declaration for the terminally ill minor. The legislature intends that the
provisions of this Part are permissive and voluntary. The legislature further
intends that the making of a declaration pursuant to this Part merely
illustrates a means of documenting the decision relative to withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures on behalf
of a minor.
209. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5(2) (West Supp. 1989).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at § 40:1299-58.5(3).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 1986); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h, § 4c (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105 (Supp. 1989).
214. Vitiello, supra note 99, at 275.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm, supra note 7, at 23.
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dissents because of his or her own needs rather than for the patient's
benefit.218 Lack of unanimity may also force the family into court. Since
the statute does not provide for an expedited hearing or appeal, taking
the dispute to court would lead to a continuation of potentially unnecessary
medical treatment.21 9 Given the other safeguards in the statute,22 one
commentator has suggested that the requirement of unanimity is unnecessary
and may, in fact, impair good decision making. 22'
The most frequently litigated situation, in regard to terminating life-
support systems, is that situation where the person is incompetent and no
declaration has been made.m It is also the area where the need for legislative
resolution is the greatest. Unfortunately, Missouri's bill does not address
this situation.
Revocation of a declaration is another area treated in various ways by
different statutes. Missouri's bill would allow revocation only if the "grantor
has decisional capacity."2 3 Other statutes, including the Uniform Act for
the Terminally Ill,22 allow revocation of the declaration regardless of the
mental state or capacity.22
Although such a provision has potential for manipulation, it "recognizes
the ultimate preference for life when [there is] doubt as to the patient's
wishes."' 6 One suggestion to prevent manipulation has been to include a
counter provision allowing reinstatement of a revoked declaration.27 The
reinstatement would be on the same or similar terms as before the rev-
ocation, so that the underlying document would not be "lost because of
a recanted expression of changed intentions. "2 8
Most statutes allow for oral revocation; some require certification of
the oral revocation. Delaware requires the oral revocation be made in the
218. Vitiello, supra note 99, at 303.
219. Id. at 301-02.
220. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5(2), 58.2(7) - (8) (West Supp. 1989).
The patient must be incompetent and have failed to prepare a directive or declaration.
He must be terminally and irreversibly ill as certified by two physicians and only
treatment that prolongs the dying process may be terminated.
221. Vitiello, supra note 99, at 302.
222. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Since In re Quinlan, seventeen states and the District
of Columbia have decided cases addressing the issue of the termination of life
support. For a comprehensive list, see Cruzan, ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 412-13 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
223. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 5.
224. UmFoRm RioHTs OF TERmNALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609, § 4(a) (1985).
225. See ARK. STAT. ANm. § 20-17-204(a) (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit
16, § 2504(a) (1983); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4 (West Supp. 1989);
WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.040 (Supp. 1989).
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presence of at least two persons, eighteen years of age or older.?29 Wyoming
allows for oral revocation witnessed by only one person, but that person
must sign a writing certifying the revocation.? 0 The revocation does not
become effective until the attending physician receives the witness' written
certification.?
Illinois also requires that the witness to a revocation must sign and
date a writing confirming the revocation, made orally or otherwise, by the
declarant. 232
Missouri's bill has no such safeguards pertaining to an oral revocation.
In light of the seriousness of the revocation and the procedural steps
necessary to make a new declaration, some sort of certification for witnessing
an oral revocation would seem appropriate and necessary. Without safe-
guards, there is increased potential for a conflict between the surrogate
health care agent and third persons who disagree with the surrogate's
decision.
Safeguards are also included to specify who may witness a declaration.
A close family member will usually be named as the surrogate, since he
or she is most likely to know what the declarant would want in a given
situation. Requiring unbiased, disinterested persons to witness the decla-
ration protects the declarant from coercion and also protects the surrogate
from an inference of self-interest.
According to the Louisiana statute, witnesses to the designation cannot
be related to the declarant by blood or marriage, or entitled to any portion
of the declarant's estate.23 Similar language is found in the Washington
and Delaware statutes.2 4 This requirement negates the inference of a conflict
of interest or coercion that might arise when close family members are
the witnesses to the designation, especially when they are also named as
the surrogates. In Rhode Island, a witness cannot be: "(1) a person you
designate as your agent or alternate agent, (2) a health care provider, (3)
an employee of a health care provider, (4) the operator of a community
care facility, [or] (5) the employee of a community care facility. '235 Okla-
homa requires that a declaration be signed in the presence of, and with
the approval of, the judge of the district court in which the declarant is
a resident .2 6
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504(a)(2) (1983).
230. Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-103(iii) (1988).
231. Id.
232. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-6(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
233. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.55(2)(9) (West Supp. 1989).
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(b) (1983); W.AS. REv. CODE § 70.122.030(1)
(Supp. 1989). Florida requires one of the two attesting witnesses to be unrelated
by blood or marriage. FLA. STAT. § 765.04(1) (1986).
235. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2(9) (Supp. 1988).
236. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 3101 (Supp. 1989). A judge may give his approval
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Missouri's bill restricts only employees, owners, directors, or officers
of a health care facility in which the declarant is a resident from being
witnesses, unless related to the declarant .2 7 Rhode Island's language appears
to be the most comprehensive and provides the most protection without
going to the extremes found in Oklahoma. Given the potential conflicts
of interest, Missouri would be prudent to adopt language similar to that
of Rhode Island.
Under California, Rhode Island, and Nevada's statutes, a spouse des-
ignated as health care surrogate automatically becomes ineligible if the
marriage is dissolved.3a Missouri's bill has no provision for a substitution
in place of a spousal surrogate in the event of divorce. In light of the
number of divorces today the legislature should include a provision to
cover this eventuality. The legislature has recognized the necessity for a
similar provision in relation to wills.239
A central purpose of the bill is to provide a legal method by which
surrogates can make health care decisions for incompetents. One way of
accomplishing this is to negate any liability associated with the decision.
Most states, in their statutes for surrogate decisionmaking, include the
release of criminal and civil liability for health care providers who act in
good faith on the directions of the surrogate.2 Missouri's bill also provides
for the release from criminal and civil liability. 241 In addition, Missouri
releases the surrogates from financial responsibility for any of the grantor's
medical expenses?42 This unique, beneficial provision will encourage people
to accept the responsibility of health care surrogacy without fear of liability
for expenses. Illinois imposes liability on the surrogate for negligent exercise
only if: (1) the declarant requests approval; (2) the attorney-in-fact consents to
serve; (3) the judge is satisfied, after any examination and investigation he deems
appropriate, that the principal is a person covered by the act who reasonably
understands the nature and purpose of the power, and that the attorney-in-fact is
a suitable person to carry out the obligations imposed upon him; and (4) the
principal has observed the provisions of the act. The judge may give approval
informally in chambers or any other convenient place without the necessity of
service of summons or other notice and shall be indorsed upon the face of the
original instrument. Id. § 1051(b).
237. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 3(3).
238. CAL. Crv. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-
2(8) (Supp. 1988); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.830 (1987).
239. Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.420 (1986).
240. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 16, §
2505 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.8 (West Supp. 1989); WAsH. REv. CODE § 70.122.050
(Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-106 (1977); Health Care Surrogate Law of
Missouri, supra note 1, § 9.
241. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 9(1).
242. Id. § 9(4).
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of the durable power, thus exposing the surrogates to financial recrimi-
nations.243
Another area consistently addressed by states is the effect of a dec-
laration on existing or future contracts for life insurance. Similar language
concerning the effect of the designation and the surrogate's decisions on
life insurance policies are found in statutes of Delaware, Washington, and
Wyoming and in Missouri's bill.244 No policy of life insurance shall be
legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining measures from an insured, qualified patient, not-
withstanding any terms of the policy to the contrary.24 This provision
allows surrogates to make decisions without fearing the loss of life insurance
benefits if death results to the declarant. The grantor is free to make his
or her wishes known and acted upon, secure in the knowledge that ben-
eficiaries will remain protected under any life insurance policies.
California and Rhode Island provide an additional safeguard not found
in other statutes. Both limit the effectiveness of a declaration to seven
years, unless the declarant specifies a shorter time period.4 This safeguard
takes into account the possibility of changed circumstances, for example,
when the declarant has forgotten that a declaration has been made that
names a person the declarant may no longer want as a surrogate. The
more probable result will be that the declarant continues to rely on his
past declaration when its effectiveness has lapsed under the statute. For
this reason, the provision should not be included in Missouri.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public education and future legislation should now focus on assisting
competent individuals to "clarify the circumstances under which they would
choose to discontinue medical treatment. ' 24 7 The goal should be to provide
a method by which a person may exercise his or her constitutional right
to control medical treatment in accordance with individual wishes. In
243. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
244. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 9 (2); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 25079(b) (1983); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.070 (1989);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-108(b) (1977). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-210(b) (Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. § 765.12 (1986).
245. Health Care Surrogate Law of Missouri, supra note 1, § 9 (2); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 25079(b) (1983); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.070 (1989);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-108(b) (1977). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-210(b) (Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. § 765.12 (1986).
246. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2
(Supp. 1988).
247. Gostin, A Right to Choose Death: The Judicial Trilogy of Brophy,
Bouvia, and Conroy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 198, 200 (1986).
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addition, the method should allow this right to continue even after the
person is no longer capable of making those decisions personally. The
development of clear legal instruments that provide a method of evidencing
the individual's intent, through durable powers of attorney or surrogate
health care decision makers, should be among the highest priorities for
both law and medicine. 248
In most respects, the durable powers of attorney or surrogate health
care acts are similarly constructed to provide a method of individual self-
determination concerning life-sustaining procedures and release of liability
to health care providers who act in reliance on those designations.
Missouri's proposed legislation allows surrogates to act for an incom-
petent grantor in a wide range of situations. This flexibility is preferable
to the rigid directives found in living wills. Additional provisions to the
legislation, however, would result in a more thorough law that would avoid
the need for future revision. As the bill is written, many potential problem
areas are not addressed, and adoption would only necessitate litigation or
further legislation to resolve those issues.
The bill, although a great improvement over existing legislation, still
does not address the issue presented to the Missouri Supreme Court in
Cruzan. Since this is the area which is most litigated, adoption of a bill
that does not address this situation would be short-sighted. A provision
regarding incompetent minors should also be included.
The amendment which excludes removal of nutrition and hydration
takes away much of the effectiveness of the bill. It, in effect, allows the
state to decide what is to be considered beneficial or burdensome to a
person. For some people, living in a comatose state, even though not in
pain, may be excessively burdensome. For others, that may not be true.
The flexibility of the surrogate health care bill, as originally written, would
allow persons to decide for themselves and to have those wishes com-
municated to others through their chosen surrogate. It would be unfortunate
for the bill to pass with the amendment intact.
Additional provisions which relate to the effect of a divorce or sep-
aration on a spousal surrogate also need the attention of the legislature.
Furthermore, safeguards that provide for unbiased, disinterested witnesses
to the declaration should be included.
Even if the General Assembly adopts the language of the bill as
introduced, without the changes recommended by this comment, the new
statute will meet a need of patients, their families and the medical community
in Missouri. In order to more completely meet that need, the legislatures
should address the situation of the person in a persistent vegetative state
248. Id.
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who has made no advance directive; the legislature should not except
nutrition and hydration from the bill's coverage,
BARBARA MILTENBERGER
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